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an employer to coerce his employees to join a union; hence picketing,
the purpose of which is to force the employer to so coerce his employees, is enjoinable. Even though picketing cannot be enjoined
either for the sole reason that (1) there is no dispute between the
employer and his employees or (2) that only a minority is participating, it can be inferred from the practical effect of the Blue Boar
case that when either of these factors exists, a finding of coercion is

likely to follow.
DnuE McKMG WALDEN

PROCEDURE IN MINORS' TORT CLAIMS IN KENTUCKY
Because of their incapacity, both legal and natural, minors' interests must be protected from designing persons who would take advantage of them. Hence they are said to be favorites of the courts
who assume the role of protector. The purpose of this note is to outline the procedure by which this protection is afforded in Kentucky,
its scope being limited to the compromise and settlement of minors'
tort claims. Since an infant cannot maintain an action until he has
reached majority, when he has a claim for personal injuries a suit may
be brought for him in one of two ways. A guardian may be appointed to settle or prosecute the claim, or a person qualifying as next
friend may bring suit in the name of the minor. Sometimes the parents acting on behalf of the minor settle and release the claim of the
child not knowing they have no authority to do so, and unaware that
the release is ineffective. Each of the above methods will be discussed
in greater detail in the body of this note in the order which they appear above.
In many situations where the minor has a claim for personal injuries his interests are placed in the hands of a legally appointed
guardian.' This guirdian is one whose appointment is provided for
by statute,2 and is not to be confused with the natural guardian who
is either a parent or next of kin. The statutory guardian may be any
person who has first made proper application to the county court in
accordance with the applicable Kentucky statutes,3 and has met with
the approval of the county court. There is, however, an order of
precedence placed upon those who may be appointed guardian: 1)
If both parents are living, whichever is most suitable, 2) if one is
'Ky.

RuLEs CiviL PRoc. see. 17.03 (1953).

'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 387.025 (1953).
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 387.020 (1958).

Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 387.025 (1953).
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dead the surviving parent if deemed suitable, 3) if both are dead then
the testamentary guardian appointed by the last surviving parent, 4)
if one has not been provided then the next of kin,4 5) and finally any
other person. This order of precedence is followed unless the interests
of the infant are hampered thereby. 5 If the minor has reached the age
of fourteen he may have a guardian appointed of his own choosing,
provided however that his choice also meets the approval of the
county court. 6 If the guardian is one other than the testamentary
guardian for nurture and education, so provided by the will of the last
surviving parent, then he must post bond before he has any legal
authority to act in the capacity of statutory guardian. 7
The county courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the appointment
of a statutory guardian.8 The county courts and the circuit courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide all matters between guardian
and ward and to remove the guardian for breach of trust.9
A guardian who has been legally appointed and approved by the
county court, and who has posted the proper bond, may fle an action
for the benefit of the minor and prosecute it to final judgment. Should
the suit be decided in the minor's favor, the guardian may recover the
amount of the judgment and manage it in the best interests of the ward
in the same manner as other asets of the ward's estate. It is not necessary in all instances for the guardian to bring suit. He may generally,
without leave of court, compromise and settle the claim of the minor,
and the ward will be bound unless it is done in bad faith or in fraud
of his rights.' 0 The permission of the court is necessary in some instances for the compromise and settlement of minors' rights.". Leave
of court must be obtained in settlements of controversies affecting the
title to real estate or where a liquidated debt or demand is due and
2
owing.'
Since these compromises and settlements are made with statutory
authority, if the guardian qualifies under the statutes it would seem
that any objection made by the minor after attaining majority would
probably be a suit to test the good faith of his guardian.
In the event that a guardian has not been appointed, or for some
reason is unable or unwilling to sue, the claim of the minor may be
'Ky.
REv. STAT. sec. 387.030 (1953).
5
Howard v. Howard, 300 Ky. 60, 187 S.W. 2d 276 (1945).
'Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 387.050 (1953).
"Ky. REV. STAT. see. 387.070 (1953).
"Bell v. Bell's Guardian, 167 Ky. 430, 180 S.W. 803 (1915). Ky. REv. STAT.
see. 887.020 (1953).
'Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 387.110 (1953).
" Jarrett v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 201 Ky. 452, 257 S.W. 17 (1923).
'Ky. I.Ev. STAT. see. 387.130 (1953).
" Manion v. Ohio Valley Ry. Co., 99 Ky. 504, 36 S.W. 580 (1896).
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brought by his next friend. 13 Depending upon the age of the minor
his assent may be necessary. 14 The next friend must be a resident of
the State of Kentucky and himself not under disability. He is required
by statute to file an affidavit showing his right to sue as next friend. 1r
The statute does not elaborate, and careful research has failed to uncover any precise requirement of this affidavit. The practice in filing
this affidavit is to state simply that the affant is a resident of Kentucky
and not under disability, and to state why he rather than the guardian
is bringing suit.' 6 Prior to the adoption of the present KENTUcKY RuLts
OF Cravi PROCEDUBE, it was also necessary for the next friend to allege
in the complaint why he and not the guardian was bringing suit.
Failure to allege this had to be taken advantage of by special demurrer
as the objection was waived by general demurrer. 17 But now, under
the new Kentucky procedure, it is not necessary to aver the capacity
in which one is bringing any suit.' 8 If the opposing party wishes to
raise an issue as to the capacity of any party to sue, he must do so by
specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.'19 The
caption of the complaint should, however, show in what capacity the
20
plaintiff is suing.
The authority of the next friend is limited in that he may only
prosecute the claim of the minor, and his authority ends with the
termination of the suit. He is not entitled to collect anything recovered. His authority differs greatly from that of the statutory
guardian; since he is not under bond he is not authorized to compromise, settle or adjust the claim of the minor.21 Inasmuch as the
next friend cannot compromise or settle the infant's claim, any attempt
on his part to do so would not be binding on the minor, and would
always be open to attack.
In many instances a guardian is never appointed nor is suit brought
by the next friend; rather, the parents of the minor, looking out for
what they consider his best interests, sign what is known as an in-

'Ky. Rura~s Crvm Pnoc. sec. 17.03 (1953).
"1In the case of Kash v. Kash's Guardian, 260 Ky. 377, 85 S.W. 2d 474
(1935), the court held a next friend could not sue if the eighteen year old minor
objected to him as next friend. However the court did not state at what age a
minor's assent was necessary, though they indicated that it would be the same age
at which a minor may choose his statutory guardian-fourteen.
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 387.300 (1953).
" Caldwells Complete Kentucky Form Book 2d ed. (1927).
17
Bartley v. Bigfold, 207 Ky. 48, 268 S.W. 2d 820 (1925).
'Ky. Ruras Civm PRoc. sec. 9.01 (1953).
Ibid.
22 Moore's Fed. Proc. sec. 9.02 p. 1906 (1948). Ky. Rules Civil Proc.
Tentative Draft, notes to sec. 9.01.
'Ambrose v. Graziani, 197 Ky. 679, 247 S.W. 953 (1923).
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demnifying release.22 This form of settlement is merely a release
whereby the parents of the minor, for a valuable consideration, release
any and all claims they may have arising out of the injuries sustained
by the infant, and further agree to reimburse the releasee in the event
the child or someone acting in his behalf should later bring suit on the
claim and be successful. This release is binding against the parents
for any claims they may have had due to the tort committed on the
child. In regard to the contract of indemnity, its character as a valid
contract is unquestionable as to the element of consideration; because
almost anything is adequate consideration to support the release of an
unliquidated claim. Although no Kentucky cases have been found to
support the proposition, it is highly arguable that the indemnity contract might be held to be against public policy, since it could be used
as a means of persuading the parents to coerce the minor into not
asserting his legal rights. There is no question as to the invalidity of
this release as it applies to the child, for the parents cannot release a
One type indemnifying release used by insurance companies.
INDEMNIFYING RELEASE
FOR THE SOLE CONSIDERATION OF ................ Dollars, the receipt and
sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, individually and as
parents and natural guardians, hereby release and forever discharge ................
heirs, executors, administrators, agents and assigns, and all other persons, firms or
corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit
any liability but all expressly deny any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of whatsoever kind or nature,
and particularly on account of bodily injuries sustained by ................ a minor
................ years of age, or arising out of damage or loss, direct or indirect,
sustained by undersigned in consequence of an accident on or about the ................
day of .......
19..... at or near .................
As further consideration for payment of said sum undersigned hereby agree
to protect the said ................ against any claim for damages, compensation or
otherwise on the part of said minor or any other party, growing out of or resulting
from injury to said minor in connection with the above mentioned accident, and
to reimburse or make good any loss or damage or costs that the said ................ may
have to pay if any litigation arises from said injuries; and undersigned hereby
waive any and all rights of exemption, both as to real and personal property, to
which undersigned may be entitled under the laws of this or any other state as
against such claims for reimbursement or indemnity by the said .............................
INWITNESS

WHEREOF .................

................ and seal ........

this ........

have hereunto set ................
day of ........

hand

19 .....

Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of:
NAM E ..............................................

.......................................................... (SEAL )
(Father)

AD D RE SS ......................................

..........................................................

NAM E ..............................................

.......................................................... (SEAL )
(Mother)

AD D RE SS ......................................

...........................................
t

(SEAL )

OJ ZI-L
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right existing in the minor alone, 23 nor can they compromise or settle
any right of the minor in their capacity as parents. This is for the
statutory guardian alone.
Although this note is for the purpose of outlining the prescribed
procedure in Kentucky for the compromise and settlement of minors'
tort claims and not to approve or disapprove it as such, nevertheless in
conclusion, it is urged that since the statutory guardian is the only
person who can legally compromise or settle the minors' claims this
procedure should be followed, if at all possible, in order to give the
proper protection to all concerned.
JAMEs T. YOTJNGBLOOD
Meyer's Adlmr., & C. v. Zoll, 119, Ky. 480, 84 S.W. 543 (1905).

EVIDENCE-BURDEN OF PERSUASION
In the early days of trial by jury when the law was an amoeba, instructions were not needed to assist the jury in reaching the result required by the applicable legal theory. As the law progressed, it became evident that the jurors were not equipped to understand and
apply the law. Consequently, it became the duty of the trial court to
give an exposition of the principles of law appropriate to the case,
restricted to the matters in issue in such a manner as to be readily
understood by the mind untrained in the law. It has been said that
although our legal system requires that instructions be made intelligible to a jury, it is not essential that they be useful to the jury.' A
cursory examination of the instructions submitted to the jury in any
civil case will reveal the shameful truthfulness of that writer's opinion.
In a sound legal system there must exist some test of ascertaining
whether a fact exists or does not exist. Some measure or amount of
persuasion must be required. Some degrees of belief must be reached
by those whose duty it is to find the facts. The purpose of this note is
to present and critically evaluate the tests expounded by the courts to
inform the jurors in civil cases as to how they shall determine whether
the proponent has sufficiently satisfied the burden of persuasion. No
attempt will be made to analyze the method employed in each jurisdiction. This note will be confined to the three formulas most frequently used to determine whether the party who has the onus probandi has convinced the jury that his fact propositions are true.
'See note, 42 YALE L. J. 194, 208 (1932).

